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 “All teachers, clerks, and businessman – step forward!” Languishing in the Jagersdorf 
German internment camp at the beginning of June 1945, Hubert Schutz was lined up against a 
demolished public building for labor selection by a Czech political squad known as a National 
Committee. This Committee, a squad formed some three weeks prior as the Soviet armies 
liberated the Bohemian city of Ostrava, was now responsible for guarding thousands of Germans 
in the camps. A fellow German internee designated as a labor commander asked Schutz for his 
identification documents.  Upon producing his Reichdokuments, proving Schutz to be a town 
mayor lacking any formal technical skill, he was led to a truck where he would be sent to the 
Witkowitz iron foundry for manual hard labor as a coal hauler. After three months of little food 
and backbreaking labor, Schutz devolved pneumonia and dysentery and was designated for 
expulsion to Soviet occupied Silesia.1  
Schutz’s situation was fairly common in the ethnically German Sudetenland in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. The iron foundry he worked for had recently been 
nationalized, like most other Sudeten industries, and forced labor was instituted to run the 
economy until Czech settlers could arrive. Similar expulsions would transform the 
demographics, economics, and social foundation of the Sudeten territories. In order to 
accomplish the massive demographic feat of moving over 30% of the population of the Czech 
lands, the government sanctioned the use of homegrown Czech partisan groups in order to lead 
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the administration of expelled territories. These Czech partisans, known as the Revolutionary 
Guards, flooded into the territory in the wake of the advancing Soviet armies and became the 
administrative authority over approximately 3 million ethnic Germans and the lands they were 
forced to vacate. 
The German expulsions would inspire massive shifts in the political orientation of the 
Sudetenland with drastic consequences for the Czechoslovak state. Within just a year the 
Sudetenland would shift political allegiance decisively towards the Communist KSC party. In the 
1946 general elections, the KSC captured over 75% of the Sudetenland votes2 and had become a 
bastion of Communist support.3 The Sudetenland would become one of the centerpieces of 
Communist political strategy into the late 1940’s and spearheaded many reforms that would 
enter the entire country following the 1948 Communist coup. However, why did Communists 
benefit so greatly from the tremendous shifts that occurred in the territory? What was the greater 
role of the Sudetenland in the spread of Communist enthusiasm to the Czechoslovak country as a 
whole? 
The Communists support can be drawn back to a number of critical developments in the 
post-war period. Communist local support was able to take root in the Sudetenland through the 
implementation of local power structures known as National Committees. This was dictated in 
the Czechoslovak governments rebuilding program that directed inclusion policies that allowed 
the Committees to lean heavily Communist in the Sudetenland. This local power structure was 
able to influence wave after wave of incoming Czech Sudeten settlers towards the infectious 
reforms of the Communist KSC party. Moreover, the vast amounts of now uninhabited former-
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German territory precipitated a mass resettling of the Sudetenland by ethnic Czechs who sought 
a better economic and social future in the region. To this end, a large proportion of those who 
arrived were in favor of reforms such as collectivized agrarian policies and nationalization of 
industries. These policies were enacted on a large scale in the Sudetenland and generated 
significant support for the Communist party that advocated for them. Fundamentally, the Czech 
people genuinely expressed Communist enthusiasm after the aftermath of the Second World War 
that Communists captured with their economic and political campaign in the Sudetenland. The 
Communists were not seen as extremists and a successful propaganda campaign enhanced their 
mystique. Communism began to be seen as the logical savior of the nation where previously 
capitalism and fascism had failed them and were enthusiastic about the changing future of the 
country. Communist leaders did all they could to convince the Czechoslovak people that 
Communists were both homegrown and dedicated to furthering economic opportunities. The 
Sudetenland would inevitably become one of the most reliable Communist bastions in the years 
following the German expulsions. One of the greatest benefits to the Communists was the 
socializing influence the Sudetenland would produce on the entire country. It seems the coup that 
later occurred under the direction of Deputy Prime Minister Klement Gottwald coincided with 
socialization of the Sudetenland and the rest of the country thereafter. The demographic shifts in 
the Sudetenland territories as a result of the German expulsions would foster the inundation of 
Communist support throughout Czechoslovakia that would eventually ease the path to power 
during the 1948 communist coup. 
The Sudetenland has always maintained an important position in most scholars’ 
discussions on Communist support in Czechoslovakia, but only to the extent that such support 
existed as an enclave. Dialogue is sparse on the magnitude of the Sudeten contribution to the 
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transition of Czechoslovakia to a Communist state and almost non-existent on the nationwide 
socialization encouraged by the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.4 Until recently, 
historiography on Communist Czechoslovakia as a whole was largely dominated by the Western 
democracies interpretation under the ideological filter imposed by the Cold War. Works written 
before the end of the cold war attribute the Communist takeover to a group of power-hungry 
leaders that consolidated power with the direct support of the Soviet Union. Karel Kaplan, one of 
the leading historians on Czechoslovak Communism during the Cold War, explains the coup was 
imposed by a combination of liberating Soviet armies and local security forces. Kaplan observes 
the undercurrent of some political support for Communism before 1948, but explains the success 
of the coup can be limited “to one, and the decisive side - power politics.”5 Under this 
interpretation, political power was snatched from a disorganized democratic opposition by a 
small handful of Communists with overwhelming force. Communist strategy developed to 
outmaneuver the democratic process and not to attract support within its structure. Kaplan’s tone 
is further reflected in authors written accounts that use words such as “subversion” and 
“conquest” to describe the transition to Communist power.6 The Cold War analysis of the events 
in post-war Czechoslovakia, embodied by Karel Kaplan’s work, would dramatically change after 
the fall of Czechoslovak Communism in 1989. 
Current historians have attempted to eschew the one dimensional Cold War works in 
favor of a more balanced approach that claims Communism in Czechoslovakia was the result of 
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both seizures of power and a function of groundswell popular support that lent the coup 
legitimacy. The examination of a great deal of archival evidence previously unavailable to 
researchers from Czechoslovak archives helped challenge the Cold War consensus. Recent 
Literature redefines the popular support that the Communists enjoyed on their rise to power.7 
The Communists maintained broad post-war enthusiasm as the best political party for the future 
for the nation and were able to successfully foster the “revision of the national character”.8 The 
Communists translated modest popular support into a weapon against a fragmented democratic 
opposition by gaining at least partial acceptance of the Communist interpretation of a 
Czechoslovak democracy. This interpretation included the initiation of more socialist programs, 
greater Communist influence in key policy decisions, and installation in certain key positions of 
power. Though strong-arm tactics did play an essential role in the 1948 coup, it was by no means 
the only reason they were able to take power. The popular support they had created weakened 
the post-war Czechoslovak democracy as more power was concentrated under their control. The 
coup may have succeeded with the help of the military, but by that point the battle had already 
been won by the Communists.  
The assertion of Communist popular support can help explain the events during the 1948 
coup and the socialization of the Czech lands as a whole. It seems the Sudetenland 
unintentionally acted as one of the major catalysts for the creation of widespread Communist 
acceptance. Sudeten regional support would be funneled into the Czechoslovak interior though a 
variety of Communist sponsored political, social, and economic policies that gained them 
popular recognition. The ethnic German expulsions would indirectly begin an unstoppable 
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process of socialization that ballooned Communist political support in the region.9 The intensive 
demographic shifts that resulted by the German expulsions presented the Czechoslovak 
Communists with an incredible opportunity to transform the political orientation of the nation. 
 
The Path to Expulsion 
The frictions between Ethnic Germans and Czechs began well before the occupation by 
Nazi Germany necessitated the expulsions. The Czech lands, encompassing the provinces of 
Bohemia and Moravia, had undergone intensive periods of Germanization in politics under 
Austrian Habsburg rule since 1620. The Czech language was forbidden from state administration 
and the Catholic German nobility sponsored religious persecution against Protestants who 
formed 95% of the Czech population.10 Germanization only began to subside after the 19th 
century Czech National Revival movement pushed for the official restoration of the Czech 
language in the Czech lands and provided for more Czech political incorporation. Yet despite 
minor tensions, ethnic coexistence had always been a foundation of the Czech lands. Ethnic 
Germans had remained an important facet of the local population since their migration to the 
Slavic realms in the early 13th century. German and Czech society was well integrated and while 
political tensions were usually divided along ethnic lines, this did not reflect any major societal 
unrest. However, the breakup of the Austrio-Hungarian Empire after World War I signaled a 
shift in the ethnic dynamic. The newly created First Czechoslovak Republic was relatively stable 
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but centralized political control meant nationalism simmered amongst non-Czechs throughout 
the interwar period.11 Czechs dominated both the central government and most national 
institutions and nationalist movements began to form in the early 1930’s aimed towards the 
formation of broader political autonomy. 
The Sudetendeustche Partei (SpD) formed in 1932 under Konrad Henlein and became 
increasingly vocal for federalization of the Sudetenland within Czechoslovakia. Sudeten 
Germans felt marginalized by the political system and believed the strong industries in the 
Sudetenland were subsidizing less developed provinces. By 1935, the Sudetenland also faced 
economic stagnation and 12 percent unemployment that contributed to the general unrest.12  
Sudeten dissatisfaction was reflected in the elections of that year where the SdP captured 68% of 
the German vote and over 15% of the entire parliamentary vote to make them the strongest party 
in Czechoslovakia. Feeling increasingly emboldened, Henlein began to gather ties to the 
National Socialists in Hitlerite Germany as a powerful ally to push for Sudeten interests. 
 Hitler first proposed plans for the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany during his 
first meeting with Konrad Henlien in mid-1937. There he expressed his ultimate goal to bring the 
Czech lands under a greater Germany in line with his slogan, “one people, one empire, one 
leader!”13 During the meeting Henlein agreed to urge the 1.35 million members of the SdP to 
demand for a self-governing Sudetenland within Czechoslovakia in order to create a crisis. 
Thereafter, Henlein issued an ultimatum under conditions dictated by Hitler that were impossible 
to meet without compromising Czechoslovak national sovereignty. Under pretexts of diffusing 
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the crisis, Hitler urged action on the Czechoslovak issue within the international community. The 
successful annexation of Austria to Germany earlier that year had met little western criticism and 
Hitler believed Britain and France would surely fold under German pressure. British Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain and French president Albert Lebrun were determined to avoid 
another European war and duly conceded to German demands for the annexation of the 
Sudetenland. The Czechoslovak government had little choice but to accept the German 
ultimatum for annexation of the Sudetenland and the resulting rump government was too weak to 
challenge German demands in 1939 that forced the Czech lands into a protectorate under 
German authority.14 With the entirety of Czechoslovakia now under his control, Hitler set out to 
make the Sudetenland an “entirely German homeland” and began transferring ethnic Czechs to 
the protectorate. This established a precedent for ethnic expulsions during the 5 years of German 
occupation and greatly antagonized ethnic Czechs desire for retribution after harsh occupation 
rule. 
Czech nationals regarded the abandonment of their western allies as a ‘stab in the back’ 
that had undermined their national sovereignty. The Czechoslovaks were now faced with the 
reality that alignment with western democracies was no guarantee of territorial protection. Faced 
with the occupation of the entire country, the Czechoslovak government formed in exile in 
Britain until Czechoslovakia could be liberated.15 Once the government was setup in London, 
rebuilding policies began to foment for the expected liberation of Czechoslovakia. One key 
debate amongst Czech politicians centered on the issue of how to handle the ethnic Germans that 
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had betrayed the nation. Initial plans discussed how ethnic Germans might be accommodated in 
a new state structure. For instance, the president of Czechoslovakia, Edvard Beneš, initially 
resurrected the idea of cantons that would be ethnically homogenous within Czechoslovakia and 
could accommodate ethnic Germans.16 However, an increasing number of Czech nationalists 
believed no solution was possible and were in favor of the radical cleansing of the entire nation 
of all Germans. The demands of this group coincided with the escalation of the war on 
continental Europe and the ferocity of German occupation and forced Beneš to consider more 
radical proposals. Beneš agreed that the Sudeten German population had essentially perpetrated 
treason by agitating for the alignment with Nazi Germany that occurred in the 1938 Munich 
agreement. Despite centuries of coexistence, many believed the wounds would be too deep to 
heal amongst the Czechoslovak people that demanded justice for occupation. Moreover, Beneš 
wanted to eliminate all possibility of future claims by Germany upon Czechoslovak territory that 
could result from a remaining German minority.17 Beneš decided the best option available would 
simply be to expel Ethnic Germans from the Czech lands into Germany. The proposal was given 
full allied support and the German population would be transferred out of Czechoslovakia at the 
wars end to create a homogenous nation for the Czech people.18 
The inclusion of the Soviet Union in the war in June 1941 was critical in the formation of 
a post-war rebuilding policy that included the expulsions. Many Czechoslovak Communists had 
fled to Moscow after the occupation of the country and created a Czechoslovak Communist 
delegation there. There the Czechoslovak Communists sought to foster dialogue between the 
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Czechoslovak government-in-exile and the Soviet government in order to influence the political 
orientation of a liberated Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London had 
also sought to increase ties with their Soviet counterparts as the Soviet Union would undoubtedly 
become the liberating force for the whole of Eastern Europe. In December of 1943, the 
Czechoslovak Communists in Moscow signed a formal declaration of friendship, ratified by 
Edvard Beneš, announcing “close and friendly cooperation after re-establishment of peace”19 
with the Soviet Union. The declaration included members from both the government-in-exile and 
the Communist delegation and bound the signatories into a pact of cooperation. In order to 
prepare the liberating government in 1944, the Soviet Union mediated the creation of the 
Czechoslovak governmental organization that gave positions of power to both voices of 
democracy and Communists. Once Czechoslovakia was liberated, the government would be a 
coalition of democrats and Communists that would implement the reconstruction and 
administration of the country. 
The result would be the so called Beneš Decrees and the Kosice Program. Of primary 
importance for returning President Eduard Benes was the complete redesign the Sudetenland 
territory with the mandate of the Allied forces in Europe. Beneš had explored the idea of German 
expulsion for those who were disloyal or who were proven fascists. However, British Foreign 
secretary Anthony Eden warned Beneš that individual guilt would put a “restrictive mechanism 
on the number of expellees” and instead any expulsions should occur under the collective guilt of 
being ethnically German.20 Thusly, the Kosice program did not distinguish between ethnic 
Germans and allowed Czechs to see all Germans as national enemies. Only those who could 
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prove their loyalty to the Czechoslovak government would be allowed to stay. The consequences 
would be felt in the harsh conditions German expellees would soon endure. The Czech 
communists had a large say in the framing of the Kosice program and exerted a large amount of 
influence in the actual actions on how the program would be carried out. The newly formed 
Czechoslovak Interior Ministry, heavily staffed by Communists, sanctioned the use of violence 
in against ethnic Germans. While moderates in the Czechoslovak government urged restraint to 
halt an impending humanitarian crisis that could reflect poorly on the nation in the eyes of the 
West, the more radical organs of government were encouraging the mob. Deputy Prime minister 
Klement Gottwald continued to use terminology such as the “liquidation” and “cleansing” of 
territories of German ethnicity.21 The Communists within government sought favorable political 
conditions in the expelled areas and sought the key provision on province administration. The 
Communists were successful in petitioning the coalition government to add to the Kosice 
program a provision detailing the “confiscation of landed estate and of the property connected 
with it [to] be carried out without compensation by the competent National Committees.”22 This 
provision became one of the linch pins of the Communist party’s political gains in the 
Sudetenland area. The provision distinguished that all confiscated properties would be 
nationalized by the state pending its redistribution to Czech settlers. Many Czech came to equate 
this initially popular provision with the Communists who had been so vocal about it benefits and 
Communist leaders from the interior ministry became the figureheads of the program. The 
Kosice program became the basis for the administration of Czechoslovakia and was further 
critical in the development of the local National Committees for local administration. 
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Communist Utilization of the National Committees 
 The Kosice programs authorized the creation of National Committee’s that became 
disproportionately staffed by Communist leaning groups and used this local power to consolidate 
provincial political control. During the following period of rapid changes, the reorganization of 
the political structure would be dominated by spontaneous generation of National Committees 
with encouragement from vocal Czech leaders. The new Czech cabinet called upon the local 
groups of citizens who had demonstrated “their worth as fighters against the invaders and traitors 
and [had] shown their true patriotic feelings” to form the core of these new local administrative 
groups.23 Given this encouragement, National Committees grew around a core of local Czech 
partisans who had resisted Nazi occupation. In many cases, heads of National Committees in the 
Sudetenland had been the leaders of their local partisan groups who had instigated small-time 
sabotage. The committees were directly instructed to, “administer all public affairs within their 
spheres of competence [;] will, together with central authorities, take measures in the interest of 
public security [;] and will set up a democratic machine of officials, subordinate to 
themselves.”24 The National Committees would function under the umbrella of the Communist 
controlled interior ministry and were heavily responsible for the administration of the 
Sudetenland. One of the major initial challenges for the young Czechoslovak government was 
the patchwork of authority created by the chaos of liberation. Communist Prime Minister 
Klement Gottwald wrote that one of the intents of the National Committees was that the 
Czechoslovak government “could consolidate the state-political and state-power organs of the 
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people, that is [through] the National Committees.”25 The decentralization of sources of power, 
especially in the liberated Sudetenland, became increasingly apparent upon the arrival of Eduard 
Benes and the official transitory government into Prague on May 13, 1945. The Kosice Program 
had articulated the structure, criteria, and design of the post-war administration of Czech 
provinces but their implementation was affected by the realities of liberation. It was through the 
method of liberation that the National Committees would become staffed with a vast majority of 
Communist supporters in key Sudetenland areas. It seems the joint American and Soviet thrusts 
into Bohemia had ramifications for the development of the National Committees and the political 
policies that followed in the Sudetenland. 
The foundation of the National committees accelerated quickly on the heels of the Soviet 
Red Army thrust into Bohemia. The Soviet advance through Moravia and into Bohemia was 
swift and arrived in two waves. The first wave of combat troops was undisciplined in their 
advance on ethnically German areas. The Soviet Army under General Alexi Antonov had pushed 
into Czech lands from Slovakia and had faced German armies extensively in Ukraine. As such, 
many Soviet divisions planned to exact revenge upon ethnic Germans whom were seen as 
inhuman as depicted by Soviet propaganda. Many Sudeten Germans were immediately 
brutalized and sent to internment camps and German depopulation would occur rather swiftly 
within the next few months under Soviet supervision. The following wave consisted mainly of 
occupation troops who were equally undisciplined. Among this wave was the First Czechoslovak 
Army Corps who had previously been incorporated into the Soviet Red Army and had fought in 
Russia. This army was declared in the Kosice program as the basis for the national army of 
liberated Czechoslovakia that would institute order in tandem with Soviet forces. Accordingly, 
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the organization of the Czechoslovak army paralleled the Soviets and received every form of 
training, political education, and pro-Soviet propaganda that did a regular Red Army solider. 
President Benes and the government seated at Kosice decided this to be a necessary step in order 
to stamp out the reemergence of ‘subversive elements’ of Czech society such as collaborators. 
The Kosice program detailed that, “in order that [the] army be trained in a civic, democratic, and 
anti-fascist spirit, the government wishes to put an end once and for all to the so-called 
‘unpolitical army’.”26 Education officers, all communist due to the communist controlled interior 
ministry, were attached to every brigade. The result was an army heavily influenced by their 
socialist education and in charge of the reconstruction of the Czech lands. In figures released 6 
months after the end of hostilities, over 2/3 of the army voted communist.27 This would be 
transformative for more than just the military occupation of the country. Partisans were an 
actively encouraged element in the army formation and would be fully integrated into occupation 
once peace was achieved.28 Homegrown Czech partisans were encouraged to participate in army 
functions and received similar political indoctrination under directive to conduct the 
“revolutionary phase” of the reconstruction. The partisans that had served under the First 
Czechoslovak Army Corp would arrive in many of the German areas of the Sudetenland before 
any other governmental groups. It seems the explicit state endorsement of partisan control meant 
that National Committees were constituted heavily of socialist former partisans who arrived with 
the Red Army. One German interned at the large Pankrac internment camp wrote one such 
National Committee member welcomed Germans into the camps as “comrades” and declared 
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that they “are genuine communists here and woe to those who try to keep us out!”29 Inevitably, 
this would shift the balance of power toward the Communists in many Sudetenland provinces. 
Conversely, American military forces had advanced to the Karlsbad-Pilsen-Budweis line 
and set up military order in a much smaller 3,800 km triangle of territory in the west of the 
country. American occupation was very dissimilar from the Soviet occupation to the east. The 
Czech lands constituted a liberated allied nation and the US Army sought to remain temporarily 
to help rebuild and reorganize the territories. Retribution against Germans or political 
indoctrination did not occur to the extent that it did in the east. In Sudeten territories, National 
Committees worked alongside the Americans in administrative duties. The Committees that were 
established under American occupation were not a primary source of order in the Sudetenland 
but merely represented a political force. Initially, socialism was not introduced to American held 
territories under the external pressure like that of the east. Moreover, expulsions did not occur 
with the same ferocity that it did under the Soviets despite American occupied areas counting for 
some of the largest concentrations of Sudeten Germans. The Czechoslovak government even 
commented to the U.S. ambassador to Czechoslovakia that U.S. soldiers were “too friendly with 
Sudeten Germans in occupied areas”.30 In contrast to Soviet areas of the Sudetenland, Germans 
were only being expelled into American occupied sections of Germany incrementally from a 
variety of internment camps and the many remaining German towns and cities. However, 
following the surrender of Japan, the American presence began to quickly fade. In September of 
1945, Germans began to be expelled in great numbers from the American section as Czech 
National Committees were handed control of local order. However, since few areas in the 
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Sudetenland contained a Slav majority, a number of local National Committees had to be 
constituted of immigrants from eastern Czech lands. By the end of the summer of 1945, the 
Sudetenland had been consolidated under the Communist interior ministry through the National 
Committees.  Klement Gottwald expressed great pleasure at the initial socialization of the 
National Committees and secretly marveled that “[the democratic opposition] did not imagine 
the National Committees as an organ of government which would have wide authority” and “the 
National Committees are the main arena of political struggle.”31 The influence of the National 
Committees in Sudeten territories would be fundamental in the shift in political power towards 
increasing socialism.  
 
Socialization of the Sudeten Economy 
One major advantage of the powers granted to the National Committees was the 
implementation of the socialist economic policies that were envisaged by Communist members 
of the central government. Most Czech citizens had come to find capitalism and political 
fragmentation, evident in the inter-war Republic, as frontrunners of fascism and demanded an 
overhaul of the system. As Eduard Benes argued from Kosice: 
“Prewar democracy proved to have many deficiencies and in many countries it helped to 
a great extent to bring about the advent of totalitarian dictatorships. It will have to be 
reformed and fully regenerated. After [World War II] political democracy will have to 
develop systematically and consistently into so-called economic and social democracy.”32 
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Benes certainly did not argue for the imposition of radical Communism upon the social and 
economic foundations of the country, but instead sought a program for the “socialization of 
modern society.”33 Most saw it as a matter of necessity as much as it was a function of lofty 
political ideals. In the aftermath of the Second World War, no political party seriously 
considered anything but a platform of radical social and economic changes.  
Czechoslovakia had undergone an intricate process of structural economic 
transformations during German occupation that were similar to those experienced by most states 
incorporated into the Reich’s war economy.34  In order to further their imperial ambitions, 
Germans subjugated and incorporated the economies of its puppet states and allies. Consumer 
goods industries were halted and redirected towards heavy goods and raw materials production 
destined for Germany as the war demanded. The tremendous amounts of German capital that 
flooded into the outlying states in the German sphere, especially the less developed countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, experienced sudden drastic economic growth and modernization. 
Slovak Communist functionary, Gustav Husak, wrote a dispatch to Moscow evaluating that, “the 
regime managed to solve economic problems to the surprise even of those who were favorably 
inclined to the regime… the situation in Slovakia is better from the point of view both of real 
wages and of the supply of goods.”35 However, the enormous economic growth came at the price 
of local control of industry and almost all important sectors were expropriated from local control. 
Thus, even before the influence of the Soviet Union style economies after the war, many Eastern 
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European states were shifted away from western style capitalism and towards socialization. The 
attractiveness of planned economies after the end of the Second World War belies the acceptance 
of the shift towards a command structured economy that had already occurred under Nazi rule. 
Czechoslovakia would become a near monolith of central economic control during the war and 
would emerge as an essentially different economy then it had been pre-war. 
The economic reforms that emerged after the war in Czechoslovakia sought to extend 
central control further and the Sudetenland became a key area of policy implementation. It seems 
the first phase of economic reforms accompanied the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. Forced 
expulsion would be immediately followed by the expropriation of German personal and public 
property and plans to resettle Czechs from the interior of the country. The three month period of 
rapid expulsion36 and acquisition by National Committees had previously taken place under the 
auspices of the Kosice Program but property wasn’t yet explicitly nationalized. The central 
government was able to accomplish this through the Decree for the Confiscation of Enemy 
Property and the Creation of a fund of National Renewal (FNO) on October 25, 1945 to begin 
the organized transfer of German property. The FNO further set up an administration to 
reprivatize the confiscated property in conjunction with the National Committees. The transfers 
of economic interests were intended to stabilize the Sudetenland and bring incentives for laborers 
to resettle the vacant territory.  
However, the transfers would be massive and challenging. During their occupation of the 
Czech protectorate, German authorities had nationalized large amounts of property and forced 
the displacement or removal of over 100,000 native Czechs. In fact, by the end of the war an 
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incredible 60 to 70 percent of the entire country’s economic wealth was German-owned. Benes 
recounted that the “Germans expropriated all key industries and banks, and in this way 
automatically prepared the nationalization of Czechoslovak point of view… even though the 
decision to administer it was in accordance with the principles of private enterprise.”37 
Inevitably, the confiscations and subsequent expulsions proved to be devastating to the economy 
of post-war Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland accounted for 75% of Czechoslovakia’s coal, 61% 
of its textiles, 76% of glass production, 38.5% of its chemicals, 55% of its paper, and it held a 
majority of many other crucial skilled industries.38 The expulsion of the German industrial 
workers in these industries would have many immediate detrimental consequences. 
The Czechoslovak government immediately realized the most pressing problem in the 
Sudetenland was the massive labor shortage it now faced. Klement Gottwald remarked that 
“following the transfer of the Germans, there will be a shortage of labor in industry of one-half 
million” and would be exacerbated by lack of housing. The lack of many skilled laborers and 
craftsman would shift the dynamics of the Czechoslovak economy away from traditional 
consumer goods. Instead, like the economies of the Soviet Union, the result was an increasing 
emphasis on the capital goods and other heavy industries that used unskilled labor. In many cases 
the effect of labor shortages was so drastic that Germans were pressed into compulsory labor for 
long periods of time and in a few cases even offered citizenship with German renunciation. 
Germans remaining in the Sudetenland, especially skilled ones, were required for “types of 
labour which fall within their own specialty” and were to become “the responsibility of the 
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commissioner of the enterprise.”39 In many skilled enterprises, Germans served as the instructors 
until the industry could become self-sufficient and then were duly expelled to Germany. All 
other Germans would be transferred to heavy industry even if it did not suit them. One German 
Professor from Prague sent to work the Sudetenland remarked in 1946 that “there were no 
German workers in Prague - but the German intelligentsia of Prague was to be turned into 
proletarians”40 His comments emphasize the rhetoric of communism that was directly imposed 
on all major industries in the Sudetenland. In dire straits, the central government believed the 
problems could only be solved through resettlement and collectivization that were used to further 
Communist propaganda from the interior ministry. 
Considering the drastic drop that resulted from the loss of German skilled labor and the 
seemingly insurmountable challenge of restoring pre-war efficiency, the resettlement of the 
Sudetenland became the first priority. The resettlement of Czech laborers into the Sudetenland 
mirrors the phases of the German expulsions. During the “wild transfer” (Divoky odsun), where 
partisan bands and Red Army units immediately forced Germans to abandon their property, the 
expulsion is characterized by the equally haphazard wave of Czech settlers. These settlers were 
largely opportunists that hoped to participate in the spoils of expulsion and acquire lucrative 
work in vacant industries. Those who arrived did so in the hopes of becoming part of either the 
local National Committees or selection as a “national administrator” of enterprises. Officially 
National Committees were responsible for the selection of candidates for these positions from 
those who initially arrived in the territory. The Kosice Program detailed the necessity of 
“competent National Committees to see to it that every plot of ground in the area is at once 
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exploited to the full, irrespective of its legal state of ownership.”41 However, due to the large 
amount of businesses and enterprises to distribute, many enterprise administrators simply took 
control of businesses on a first come first serve basis and were subsequently granted authority by 
the National Committees. Oftentimes, the National Committees simply wanted to get production 
restarted and would accept enterprise administrators on a temporary basis until a more qualified 
employer could be found. This jockeying for better career position and standard of living became 
one of the main reasons for settlers to arrive in the Sudetenland. By the end of this initial period, 
80 percent of enterprises in the region had Czech national administrators representing some 
12,000 plants, workshops, and enterprises.42 In conjunction with the administration of the 
National Committees, individual enterprise production was resumed very soon after German 
confiscations. 
The second resettlement period, during the “forced expatriation” (nucene vysidleni) of 
German expulsions, accounted for the vast majority of the eventual Sudeten settlers. Almost 2 
million Czechs would eventually settle in the Sudetenland during this phase as Germans began to 
leave in greater numbers.43 By the summer of 1946 over 900 workers a day entered Sudeten 
factories and the Sudeten economy was recovering.44 However, the extensive government 
resettlement plans in place were not immediately executed despite the substantial amount of 
Germans expelled during the ‘wild transfer’. Benes government waited to implement centralized 
resettlement plans mainly due to the severe deficiency of acceptable housing for settlers. Despite 
nationalizing over 640,000 apartments and houses in the first 6 month period following 
liberation, “some belonged to Czechs returning to the area, some were primitive even by interwar 
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standards and others suffered war damage and needed reconstruction.”45 To facilitate the 
reorganization of the Sudetenland, the Ministry of the Interior created the Settlement Office 
(Osidlovaci urad) during the fall months. The Settlement Office was acutely aware of the mass 
housing initiatives of the interwar period where “local, independent, and privately funded” 
projects were often never completed or were no bigger than a single building.46 The solution was 
to use state supported building projects to create acceptable housing that was jointly owned by 
the state and private enterprise. This action was compatible with Benes’ plan to create a “modern 
socialist state” and even the architecture of the buildings was required to be of a “socialist 
design.”47 Until new housing could be constructed, the Settlement Office instructed Czech 
settlers to move into hotels, provisional lodgings, or commonly into houses with the Germans 
themselves. Most German families were required to open up the majority of their housing to 
make room for Czechs.48 The vast majority of the incoming Czechs would have to wait until the 
housing situation was alleviated and this limited huge numbers of initial settlers. 
By 1946 the completion of a number of construction projects and the fulfillment of the 
bulk of expulsions had opened enough housing to allow for full-scale resettlement operations. 
The central plan envisioned Sudetenland areas resettled up to 75% of their pre-war population in 
all the most critical economic areas. The transfers had reduced Czech population by over 25% so 
as settlers arrived in an area already at a population maximum, they were directed to find 
settlement in a different district.49 In this way the lucrative industrial areas were populated 
quickly. However, total resettlement was nowhere near enough to compensate for the 
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reinvigoration of the economy to pre-war levels. Part of this problem was the rootlessness of the 
Czech settlers that arrived for factory work. Laborers were easily dissatisfied, had low-morale, 
and were unwilling to put in the same work that Germans had put in. Moreover, having little 
cultural or social connections to the area made leaving one job for another easily possible. As a 
result the productivity per worker declined and contributed to the labor shortage as more laborers 
were needed to reach similar output. The labor shortages had become so dire that even the 
Czechoslovak army was forced to help out in the critical mining industry.50 Shortages occurred 
most heavily in industries that were labor intensive and these were often the foundation of the 
Sudeten economy. For example, the Stalin Works near Litomerce in Sudeten northwest 
accounted for 96 percent of domestic consumption of fuel and supplied a large number of 
factories with its output yet shortages required German compulsory labor.51 The Ministry of 
Industry commissioned a statewide classification of industry to deal with the problem. Industries 
were to be classified on their value and necessity to the Czechoslovak economy, their 
productivity, and their profitability. Category A firms would represent critical industries for the 
entire economy. Category B were those that were productive but could be shut down if required. 
Finally, category C were marked as unproductive and scheduled for closure. The assets of 
category C firms would usually be marked for distribution to other industries or even moved to 
areas that could produce more effectively. Immediately, this became hugely unpopular to 
laborers who settled under difficult conditions and feared the loss of their one benefit available in 
abundant employment. Communist National Committees however were able to take advantage of 
the impending plant closures by vocally advocating against them and in many cases simply 
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ignoring the directives of the Ministry of Industry. The closure of a plant within their 
administration would limit their power and hurt their prestige. Many laborers took note of the 
actions of the National Committees and attributed successes to the Communists.  
It seems the economic transformation of the Sudetenland resulted in numerous political 
consequences that further reinforced the Communist position. The Communists celebrated their 
political inroads and Communist influence in the Sudetenland was a major factor in the success 
the KSC party garnered in the 1946 parliamentary elections. The Communist involvement in the 
National Committees and the subsequent socialist influence they were able to achieve in Sudeten 
areas was mirrored by their inroads into the successful economic policy. Gradually, the KSC 
party made significant gains in the Sudeten areas and their local communities and Communist 
patronage was rewarded in the 1946 parliamentary elections. The 1946 elections would prove the 
key watershed moment in transfer of Sudeten Communist enthusiasm into both electoral gains 
and general socialist influence throughout the country. The Benes government, with Communist 
prodding, issued a decree immediately before the elections in May requiring that National 
Committee representation be based upon the results of the general parliamentary vote. This 
would be critical for the consolidation of Communist rule throughout the entirety of the Czech 
lands as it allowed Communist votes in majority areas to overcome the democratic opposition’s 
votes. The Communists were able to secure majorities in almost all of the Sudetenland in the 
general elections and in most cases the support was higher than 75%. The distribution of Czech 
electoral districts was such that the large proportion of Communist votes in the Sudetenland 
watered down the significance of the general slight democratic opposition majorities in the 
interior of the outer districts. The consequences for a democratic influence became immediately 
clear as Communists handily won 138 of the 163 districts in the Czech lands with 40% of the 
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vote.52 The vote was all the more influenced by the recent implementation of land reform that 
redistributed agricultural lands. Klement Gottwald hailed the historic vote for the KSC and 
believed the “Communist party has such influence that it is able to assert itself.”53 The economic 
transformation of the Sudetenland was generally seen as a success in the eyes of many Czech 
commoners and the presence of Communists at all levels of the country lent them legitimacy. 
The KSC could now approach issues in parliament with a majority and the democratic forces 
were no longer on an even playing field in politics. Further, the majority of Communist support 
came from the Sudeten areas and was able to redraw the electoral map by overcoming the 
democratic support in many parts of the exterior. Sudeten support was a major factor in the 
Czech lands shift towards direct Communist political control after the elections of 1946. 
 
Shifting Czechoslovak Cultural Attitude 
The socializing economic reforms attributed to the KSC and the overall progressive 
appearance of the party tied in well with the general KSC campaign to capture the national 
enthusiasm. The Communists were immediate in furthering political support once power had 
infiltrated most Czech areas by launching an effective propaganda campaign designed to 
convince Czechoslovaks of their ‘socialist history’.54 The communists sought to utilize the wave 
of changing values and increased nationalism for the “revision of the national character.”55 
Aware that patronage and political influence could only further the communist cause to a degree, 
                                                          
52
 Ther and Siljak. Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe 1944-1948, 251. 
53
 Klement Gottwald, Memoirs of Klement Gottwald, 59. 
54
 The KSC launched a campaign in 1946 denoting the socialist nature of Czechoslovak national hero’s such as the 
Tomas Masaryk and 16th century local protestant sect missionary Jan Hus. The campaign portrayed the history of 
Czechoslovakia as a people constantly under oppression from Austrians nobility, capitalist doctrines, and then 
Germans. This stifled the Czechoslovak inherent socialist Slavic nature. Bradley Abrams book The Struggle for the 
Soul of the Nation lays out a decent overview of the socialized historical campaign. 
55
 Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1948: The Failure of Coexistance. 176. 
26 
 
the communists sought to capture the sympathies of Czechoslovak people for political ends. It 
seems the elections of 1946 marked a turning point for the communist embrace of this shift in 
national character as an endorsement by the people.  The ordinary Czech began to increasingly 
sympathize with the communists that offered “material rewards or power, or both, as 
compensation for the years of suffering.”56 The KSC had begun planning the elements for a 
culture campaign immediately after liberation but the legitimization offered by the elections 
meant political rhetoric could begin as well. The communist Minister of Information Vaclav 
Kopecky hailed the “new era of our new Czechoslovak culture” and the communist-leaning 
newspaper Tvorba called for “a critical revision of everything that seemed stable for ages… a 
great revaluation of all values.”57 For the Communists, a revision of the Czechoslovak 
perspective on issues both economic and political was necessary.  
To this end, Klement Gottwald began using the “Czechoslovak road to socialism” to 
describe the economic and social transformations that the Communists had popularized. The 
class warfare and social upheaval of Marxism could be abandoned for the peaceful 
transformation of the Czechoslovak Communists. The introduction of the Two-Year Plan 
following the 1946 elections began the further application of the economic and social changes 
that were to form the basis for the ensuing political strategy. The Two-Year Plan instituted 
national targets on rebuilding economic and social structures and was similar to those policies 
implemented into the Sudetenland. Many communists were eager to institute these further 
reforms state-wide to Czechoslovakia that had now been tested and were so politically expedient 
for their cause. Communist Gustav Bares declared the plan as changing “not only the economy, 
                                                          
56
 Zinner. Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1948, 111. 
57
 Abrams, The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism, 93. 
27 
 
but also social relations, morality and the people themselves.”58 The acceptance of this was so 
great that even President Benes and the fragmented democratic opposition did not oppose 
programs that were clearly to their political detriment. Communist controlled state organs began 
to take advantage of this and began to actively engineer a strategy to impact the convictions of 
the masses. The end of party parity in favor of the communists following the 1946 parliamentary 
elections was used to strengthen communist’s image as a non-radical party for general progress.  
Moreover, the KSC began to become involved in extra-political organizations to increase 
their influence and sharpen their support. KSC leadership hoped to push for further 
nationalizations of Czech industry and the collectivization of farms. However, backlash from 
other political parties in the National Front remained stiff and plans to push greater socialist 
reforms had to be shelved temporarily. In order to continue communist reforms the communist 
government began to rely on the use of trade unions. Unlike the fragmented post-war trade union 
system that was split along party lines, the Nazi occupation favored consolidation and liquidation 
into a single trade union, the Revolucni Odborove Hnuti (ROH), which would be easier to 
control. The communists were immediately aware of the benefit of the ROH. The possible 
support of such a massive centralized trade union made groundswell support unnecessary as the 
organization had over 1.8 million members.59 Moreover, ROH organization structure was 
organized by region and district instead of trade or industry so as to ensure the continued unity 
within the organization. Centralized control of the pyramid superstructure would mean 
coordinated organizational policy was easily achieved. By 1946 the communists had taken 
control of key positions in the ROH by the placement of National Committees and pressure from 
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the KSC party leadership. The ROH became a reliable arm of the Communist party from which 
they could institute further social changes. 
The first such change took shape in 1946 as the Foundation Program was legislated in 
parliament under communist sponsorship to benefit the economy nation-wide. The program 
detailed the rebuilding of the national economy with special provisions for the Sudetenland to 
meet the somewhat greater challenges of reconstruction. Under this cover, the communist party 
was able to pass legislation that was essentially the same as the Eighth KSC Congress platform.60 
The program finalized the last of the German expulsions and the Czech resettlement and 
introduced programs to capitalize on the post-war patriotism of the workers. To compensate for 
the labor shortages, the workers would be encouraged to participate in the “national mobilization 
of labor” on the basis of patriotism and personal honor.61 Zdanek Radvanovsky explains that the 
effect of the mobilizations returned “qualified workers to their occupations convince people 
without jobs to do productive work, ensure that the most important productive sectors would 
attract new talent, and increase the number of working women.” The program went into effect 
during the spring of 1946 and seemingly produced an impact on the Sudetenland. The labor 
shortages began to slightly decline and the Sudetenland was able to meet the daunting industrial 
targets of 10% growth in 1946.62 Laborers in the mining industry even organized “national 
shifts” on a voluntary basis that added extra working hours and work on Sundays. However, the 
program was not a compulsory program and the communist reforms required workers 
organizations and trade unions to inspire participation on the basis of civic duty. The Foundation 
Program in the Sudetenland may have only produced marginal economic benefits, yet the value 
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of the program might be better assessed as a means of communist participation. Within months 
of the Sudeten measures, similar rebuilding efforts were launched through the ROH into other 
Czech districts. This contributed to the view that the KSC was a patriot party above a communist 




The previous two and a half years had seen stunning victories for the KSC within the 
democratic post-war confines. The Sudetenland was proven to be the centerpiece of their 
stunning infiltration of political power and support at all political levels. The seizure of the 
National Committee positions in 1945 as the German expulsions heated up had allowed the 
communists to expand their base to over 1.5 million Czechoslovakians and the support largely 
remained.63 Moreover, the expulsion of the German population was exploited by communists 
who realized the opportunity 40,000 sq. km of vacant land presented for the socialization of the 
territory. The National Committees were often the first legal administrators that settlers and 
partisans encountered upon entering the Sudeten territory from the interior. As such, the 
Committees were especially responsible for the political indoctrination the incoming Czechs had 
received. The influence resulted in the transformation of the borderlands a bastion of communist 
support. The support of the Sudetenland was critical in turning the tide against the democratic 
forces and introduced communist administrators into areas that had remained democratic until 
that point.  
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The communist local and state organs were able to proceed with their experimentation 
with the socialization of the Sudetenland and this became a proving ground for economic policy. 
Policy introduced into the Sudetenland as rebuilding measures would precede its introduction 
into the rest of Czechoslovakia when the general introduction of such policies followed the 
communist electoral victory of 1946. Moreover, the economy of the Sudetenland had come to 
drastically change the perceptions that ordinary Czech held on various communist economic 
policies and their place within Czechoslovakia. Czechs had come to view communists with 
enthusiasm and believed they should become the legitimate authority of the people after their 
economic success.  
Of greater implication for the German expulsions in the Sudetenland and underlying 
socialist agenda that took hold is the connection to the broader Eastern European Communist 
experience. Communists groups in most countries liberated by the Soviet Red Army seized the 
opportunity of wartime trauma at the hands of the occupying Germans to further their own image 
and enthusiasm amongst the local population.64 They trumpeted their valiant resistance during 
state liberation in an active collaboration between the Soviets and Communist partisans. Much 
like similar myths that permeated other countries throughout Europe, Czechoslovaks had a 
significant interest in growing the fabrication of resistance towards an external German threat.65 
Communists were especially motivated to carry out the expulsion of Germans from 
Czechoslovakia to corroborate this myth amongst the Czechoslovak people. The collective guilt 
ascribed to ethnic Germans made it significantly easier to indulge the Czechoslovak resentment 
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and perhaps even embarrassment over German occupation. The expulsions in the Sudetenland 
became a vessel with which the Czechoslovakia could revise their national character while also 
homogenizing a multi-ethnic state. 
The KSC became the heir to the post-war legacy in both organization and spirit which 
they actively encouraged. Citizens felt that Communist action was the only national recourse 
after the devastations that they believed democratic and capitalist values had brought them at the 
end of the interwar period. Communist influence was celebrated with enthusiasm as the 
progression in a long march towards normalization of the Czechoslovak territory. By the end of 
1947, Klement Gottwald had built up enough political, popular, and economic capital that the 
democratic process could safely be discarded. The existence of a democracy was all but a farce 
as most real power positions were under communist control and the nation only needed a small 
push to send it over the edge. Prime Minister Klement Gottwald entered Prague’s old town 
square in late February with the support of the military and from there communist revolution 
swept the country. Almost no violence accompanied the coup and democratic leaders resigned 
voluntarily further illustrating the general mood of acceptance toward communist rule. The 
Sudetenland became a watershed of communist change immediately after the liberation of the 
country and played perhaps the most important role in the transformation of the country. The 
territory was on the communist cutting edge of reforms politically, socially, culturally, and 
economically and would funnel communist values into the Czech interior. The Sudetenland 
served as the final puzzle piece that pushed the threshold of Communist support to the point 
where Communists could realistically realize their ambitions for power. Ultimately, the 
Sudetenland became the centerpiece of the KSC strategy to induce the socialization of the 
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entirety of Czechoslovakia and the drastic demographic changes there allowed the Communists 
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